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Abstract
This article reports on a decision model that highlights a reward-based promotional 
strategy for a bus organization to maintain its market. The market control law 
is obtained from an optimal solution in the system equations on the basis of the 
relationship among the transit operator, ticket agent, and government. The article 
presents a case study for the Taipei bus transit system. Results in this research con-
firm the effectiveness of the proposed strategy for bus operators as well as for traffic 
improvement. The proposed model reveals the optimal actions for the agent and bus 
operators under governmental policy. 
Introduction
Public transit ridership in many urban areas is declining. Passenger cars are pre-
ferred for travel, subsequently inducing traffic congestion. Although transporta-
tion authorities have implemented several encouraging policies, such as tax deduc-
tions and exclusive bus system operations, passengers lack interest in traveling by 
bus because such transportation policies do not directly benefit the customers. In 
addition, the elasticity of the price of public transportation is extremely low (Lago, 
Mayworm, and Mcenroe 98), with an average range of -0.28 ± 0.6. Such inelas-
tic circumstances imply that reducing the fare price leads to a net loss in revenues. 
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Indeed, almost all countries have a regulated pricing scheme for public transporta-
tion. Applying various pricing strategies to affect transportation markets directly 
conflicts with such regulations. Therefore, a stimulatory strategy is expected to 
ensure the survival of bus operators and increase public transit system use.
This study presents a novel incentive system to exert control on the transporta-
tion market. The proposed system focuses on selling prepaid tickets merged with 
a lottery to satisfy the operator’s expectations, particularly in terms of ridership 
or revenue. A case study is conducted to verify that such a strategy yields a sat-
isfactory solution for bus operators while also alleviating traffic congestion. As a 
concrete measure in the proposed strategy, the government is to apply a subsidy 
policy for bus operators when total passenger loads reach a certain threshold 
within a specific period. Bus operators can also encourage their ticketing agent 
to promote the use of prepaid tickets by offering a bonus to the agent when the 
amount of ticket sales achieves a certain quantity. The agent is also offered sev-
eral reward grades measured in purchased tickets or mileage for passengers. This 
incentive strategy subsequently stimulates the market.
Control theory is the basic methodology in the analysis of marketing relationships 
within the proposed promotional system. The upper level of the strategic goal 
is to alleviate traffic congestion by encouraging individuals to travel by bus. The 
primary level is to maximize profits for the ticketing agent and the bus operational 
organization. The proposed model is constructed with the agent’s and the bus 
operators’ profits, respectively, in terms of time. The solution identifies the sensi-
tivity and optimality of the control variables.
Premises for Modeling
Incentive System Structure
Figure  depicts the relationships among the ticketing agent, bus operators, and 
the government in the incentive system. According to these relationships, the 
ticket sales agent attempts to obtain maximum profit through a promotional 
strategy for selling a sufficient quantity of tickets. The agent’s profit includes the 
net revenue from selling tickets and a bonus obtained from the bus operators. 
The bus operators’ profit comes from carrying more passengers and possibly 
from a government subsidy. To obtain the subsidy, the operator must meet a 
performance threshold of total passengers carried within a period, T. If more 
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people travel by bus, traffic congestion is reduced and the quality of life in the city 
improves. Passengers expect to win an incentive prize from the ticketing agent.
Passenger Incentive Types
Promotional design of the prepaid tickets should be as attractive as possible. To 
extend the bus transportation market, noncaptive passengers are the targets of 
the promotional program. According to one survey (Jiang 998), a lottery is one 
of the most attractive activities for noncaptive passengers. In this study, a lottery 
game is designed for the purpose indicated. In the game, both instant and delayed 
rewards are considered. The quicker an individual purchases a prepaid ticket card 
the higher the probability of winning an instant reward. After spending the pre-
paid value of the ticket, the individual has the opportunity to win a grand prize. 
This strategy encourages individuals not only to purchase prepaid tickets, but also 
to travel by bus. The structure of the prize layout was arranged as a pyramid with 
multiple layers and items. The grand prize is generally awarded at the end of a 
given period, denoted as T.
Passenger Demand Function
During this analysis the passenger demand function is formulated first. Based on 
the formulated demand function, profits for the ticketing agent and bus operators 
can then be estimated. Demand is affected by fare and level of transport services 
such as route, frequency, vehicle-quality (seat, air-conditioned), driver behaviors, 
and so forth. All routes are assumed to have already been allocated and cannot 
be changed; the number of existing vehicles is sufficient for any frequency exten-
sion (i.e., bus transport capability is far from exhausted and in a depressed period); 
vehicles are all in the range of usage; and employed drivers are experienced. All 
people know the fare, route network, schedules, and traffic conditions. The ana-
lytical change in price, even through a lottery activity, is relatively small compared 
to the basic transportation price from the regulated fare. Under these conditions, 
Figure 1. Relations among Sales Agent, Bus Operators, and Government
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the two factors of ticket price and incentive prize are sufficient to determine the 
demand variation for most road users. Thus, the demand function is assumed to 
be linear (McConnell and Brue 993) in terms of the price and the expectation of 
winning a prize in the incentives:
q(t)=ap(t)+bE(M)+c ()
where:
q(t)   denotes the volume of bus trips at time t
p(t)   represents the price of a bus ticket in a unit sale at time t, 
  t ∈[0,T]
E(M)  is the expectation of winning a prize M
a, b and c  are parameters; a must be negative and b be positive
The expectation of winning a prize, of the given incentives, is defined by
E(M)=  (2)
where:
Mj	 	 expresses the prize of jth item of the rewards
f	(Mj)		 is the probability of winning the reward Mj	, 0 ≤ f	(Mj) ≤
Profit Model for a Ticket Sales Agent
Based on the three premises above, the ticketing agent’s profit can be clarified. The 
ticket agent’s profit is calculated as the sum of the net profit from selling tickets 
and the bonus, with the cost of the prizes issued to lottery winners deducted 
according to the promotional policy. Assume that the basic price of a ticket is C, 
which the bus consortium (organized by the bus operators in Taipei city) con-
tracts to the agent. The agent sells a unit ticket to a passenger with the price p(t). 
Thus, the agent’s profit at time t is [p(t)-C] q(t), p(t)>C. Obtaining p(t) in Equation 
(), the profit can be derived as follows: 
[p(t)-C] q(t) = [(q(t) - bE(M) - c) - C]q(t)	 (3)1a
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The gross gain from ticketing in period [0,T] is
∫0
T
		 [(q(t) - bE(M) - c) - C]q(t)(1+i)T-tdt (4)
where:
i  denotes the interest rate
In addition, supposing that the bus consortium sets the threshold for tickets sold 
at level H for paying a bonus, and the agent gains the bonus B(·) if the tickets are 
sold out to the amount of Q(T) in period T: 
B(Q(T))  (5)
Equation (5) indicates that the agent’s bonus vanishes if ticket sales do not reach 
the volume H. The agent will have a bonus of B(·) if the H volume is sold out. In 
general, B(·) is designed as a linear function with a marginal bonus while the sold 
quantity is beyond H. However, the expenditure of the agent for the lottery is
E(M)=Σ Mj	lj = M1 l1 + M2 l2  (6)
where:
lj represents the quantity of the reward	j
The first item (j=) is the expenditure for the instant reward and the second item 
(j=2) denotes the prize bestowed at the end of the given period of T. In consider-
ing the instant reward, the right-hand term in Equation (6) could be replaced by
∫0
T
		 [m1(t)l1(t)(1+i)T-tdt	+	M2 l2	 (7)
where:
m1(t)  denotes the price of an instant reward
l1(t)  represents the quantity of the instant reward
In brief, Equation (7) is used instead of the following form:
∫0
T
		 	 (8)
1
a
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By incorporating Equations (4), (5), and (8), the total gain of the agent yields the 
following:
G = ∫0
T
		 	 (9)
With the maximum profit objective, the extreme value from Equation (9) is obtained:
G* = max ∫0
T
		 	 (0)
While considering the agent’s attitude in referring to Equation (5), three possible 
types of actions are dealt as follows:
. The agent may discard obtaining the bonus if the threshold of the sold ticket 
volume is too high to afford. The proposition is written as
 
 ()
2. For Type II, the agent decides that his task is to reach the threshold for getting a 
bonus. He is not willing to put forth further sales effort due to the low margin for 
a bonus. The proposition is written as
 
 (2)
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3. For Type III, based on the bonus condition in Equation (5) issued by the bus 
operators, the agent realizes that more profit can be earned by selling more tickets. 
The proposition is as 
 (3)
Next, an attempt is made to identify the agent’s final decision from the above 
three propositions. To do so, Equations (), (2), and (3) must be solved with 
respect to variable q(t). Since the propositions are dynamic problems depend-
ing on time t, the optimal control theory is applied (Chiang, 992; Kamien and 
Schwartz 99). Let x=x(t)=q(t) and 
 (4)
 
According to the Euler equation (Kamien and Schwartz 99), to find the extreme 
value from Equations (), (2), and (3), the following function holds:
 (5)
 
Substituting Equation (4) into the differential Equation (5) yields, at time t, 
 (6)
 
This is a general solution form. Different constraints in each type lead to different 
results. Based on the constraint and boundary conditions in Type I, we obtain the 
following result:
 (7)
 
By integration,
 (8)
· ·
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Substitute Equations (7) and (8) into (0) yields
  
 (9)
as well as from Equation (),
 (20)
 
Similarly, for Type II, we have
 (2)
 (22)
 
 (23)
 
 (24)
For Type III, the bonus function, described in previous, could be replaced by
 (25)
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and this implies
 (26)
 
where:
 x(tf ) denotes the total quantity of sales until the termination, tf  = T
K  is the marginal bonus, the incentive for an extra sale 
Consequently,
 (27)
 
 (28)
 
 
Then, we obtain the following result:
  
 (29)
and corresponding to
 
 (30) 
The optimal action of the agent should be the most profitable one based on the 
description of the three types under given conditions:
 (3)
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Profit Model of Bus Operators
Bus operators are concerned with the profit they will earn so their goal is also 
maximum profit. The bus operators’ profit function is comprised of the net rev-
enue from their service, the amount of the bonus awarded to their agent, and the 
governmental subsidy due to their contribution to traffic congestion relief. The 
governmental subsidy is provided only if the total number of busloads during 
the fiscal period surpasses the regulated threshold. Net revenue in service is the 
income from the ticketing agent after deduction of the operating costs shared in 
the processing of the electronic readers on buses.
While assuming that the operating cost shared in processing one ticket is f and 
the net revenue per ticket is (C - f ), during the period [0,T	], the operators’ total 
profit W is calculated by
 (32) 
in which, GP ( Nb ) represents the governmental subsidy:
   
 
where:
  Nb  denotes the total number of loads carried by the bus operators
   is the unit of subsidy with respect to a load 
D  is the threshold for the subsidy 
Both  and D are regulated by the government. Therefore, the object function of 
the bus companies is set to be maximum profit as follows:
 (33)
 
Since three types of agent attitudes have been described, the bus operators also 
have three respected treatments. Substituting Equations (7) and (8), or (2) and 
(22), or (27) and (28) into Equation (33) subsequently yields
 (34)
^
^
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where: 
k indicates the three types , k=,2,3, respectively
As previous shown in Equation (25), the bonus can be expressed using the follow-
ing general form:
B(Q(T)) = B(H) + K[Q(T) - H] (35)
The bus operators’ profit can then be obtained
 (36) 
If the ticket agent has made his decision, the bus operators’ profit can clearly be 
confirmed.
Calibration of the Demand Function
A case study is presented for bus operation in Taipei City, where the Taipei Bus 
Consortium consists of eight bus companies. Passengers pay for bus fare with 
a prepaid magnetic card. The prepaid ticket cards are sold through a wholesale 
agent. The agent sells the prepaid ticket cards from ticketing windows distributed 
throughout Taipei City in convenience stores. To understand the feasibility of 
implementing the previous model in Taipei City, consumer opinions were investi-
gated using a questionnaire survey. The survey focused largely on understanding 
demand from and incentives to passengers. The questionnaire was designed to 
allow travelers to easily state their preferences.
The contents of the questionnaire are: () vehicle ownership—motorcycle, pas-
senger car; (2) trip purpose with transportation modal choice and frequencies in 
the current run; (3) frequency change of riding the bus if the fare varies a ∆p; (4) 
level of preferences if a lottery is involved in the bus ticketing; and (5) frequency 
variations of riding the bus corresponding to different prize structures in a ticket-
ing lottery game.
With a 5 percent level of significance in a random sampling of ,320 Taipei citizens 
from the phone directory, the statistical results show the following implications:
• The transportation mode distribution for Taipei citizens is one-fifth for buses, 
and four-fifths for other modes such as motorcycles, passenger vehicles, and 
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taxis. This indicates that approximately one-fifth of the citizens are classified 
as captive bus passengers and four-fifths are noncaptive bus passengers.
• On average, the mean and standard deviation for bus use frequency for 
captive bus passengers are 3.90 and 5.33 trips per week, respectively. The 
mean and standard deviation for noncaptive bus passengers are .3 and 
0.58 trips per week, respectively.
• Approximately 70 percent of all citizens consider purchasing promotional 
tickets merged with a lottery game. Compared to the current one-fifth of the 
population that travels by bus, the lottery promotion can enhance public 
transportation ridership.
• For the original captive passengers, if the ticket fare increases a unit, they will 
reduce their bus usage by an average of .6 trips per week. In the noncap-
tive group, if the ticket fare decreases a unit, these passengers may expand 
their bus usage by an average of 0.35 trips per week.
• The likelihood of traveling by bus increases as the expectation of winning a 
prize increases. The analysis of variance shows that with a 5 percent level of 
significance with our promotional alternatives, there is nearly no difference 
between captive and noncaptive passengers in terms of bus use frequency. 
When the total reward ($5,000,000) is distributed over the structured pyra-
mid proposed for alternative , the mean increase in bus use frequency is 6.39 
trips per week and the standard deviation is 7.050. If the double incentive in 
alternative 2 is used, the mean increase in bus use frequencies is 7.43 trips 
per week. If the expectation value increases a unit, the increase in frequency 
for all samples is 0.03 trips per week.
Based on the survey, the demand function is calibrated as follows:
For captive passengers
(37)
 
 
(*  the t-value, ** the coefficient of determination, *** the F-value)
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For noncaptive bus passengers
 (38)
 
For all samples
 (39)
 
where:
∆qb denotes the quantity variation corresponding to price variation   
per trip for taking a bus
∆pb represents the price variation per trip 
∆E	(M) is the expectation variation for winning a prize
 
Obviously, from Equations (37) and (38), in light of the price variation, captive 
passengers are more sensitive than noncaptive passengers. Conversely, in consid-
ering expectation variation, noncaptive passengers are more sensitive than captive 
passengers.
To understand the market tendency under the promotional strategy, the demand 
function in terms of price and the expectation of winning a prize should be clari-
fied. This demand function can be derived from the difference in Equation (39). 
Next, Equation (39) is transformed into a step function
 (40)
where:
a0 = -1.24
b0 = 0.454
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In considering the current mean frequencies for taking the bus transit by captive 
and noncaptive bus passengers, 3.90 and .3 trips per week, weighting with one-
fifth of the total trips for captive and four-fifths for noncaptive, the population 
mean frequency for taking the bus is estimated to be 3.828 trips per week. In Taipei 
City, the current bus price is uniformly $5 per trip without promotion. Thus, the 
boundary state values can be set as qb = 3.828, pb = 15, and E
0 (M) = 0. By math-
ematical inductive method (Saber 996), Equation (40) implies
qb(t) = -1.24pb(t) + 0.454E(M) + 22.428 (4)
Letting qb(t) be deducted qb
0, the induced quantity for taking the bus at time t, 
qb
+ (t), due to the promotion, is calculated as
qb
+ (t) = -1.24pb(t) + 0.454E(M) + 18.6 (42)
 
Furthermore, if the quantity is expressed by the number of prepaid ticket cards in 
terms of card price and expectation value, Equation (42) yields
 (43)
 
where:
N  denotes the number of trips paid using a card
 
In Taipei City, a ticket card with $600 can pay for 40 trips (independent of trip 
distance). By doing so, the demand function is finally realized as follows:
qc
+ (t) = -7.75x10-4 pc(t) + 113.5x10
-4 E(M) + 0.465 (44)
Equation (44) represents a person’s extra demand trend in unit of card quantity.
Market Analysis
The market effect is primarily evaluated in terms of the sensitivities and tenden-
cies of the bus consortium and the ticketing agent, as well as efficiency in public 
transportation. As stated in previous sections, obviously the government controls 
the period length T, subsidy premium GP( Nb ), and threshold D for subsidy. The 
00
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bus consortium determines basic ticket price C, operating cost f, bonus B(H), 
threshold loads H for receiving bonus, and its margin K. Game bucks M1 and M2 
distributed over the structured pyramid layer L1 and L2 are provided by the ticket 
agent. These parameters definitely influence the variations in p*, Q*, G*, W*, and 
Nb. These are clarified as follows: 
• Governmental Policy and Domination. Assuming that the government 
approves and supports the implementation strategy, how much GP(Nb), 
D, and T should be initially announced by the promotional policy? In the 
following case study, the periodic activity cycle is normally assumed to 
encompass one year due to the fiscal system. Based on the records for the 
past two years, the city government sponsored the city bus consortium with 
$300 million annually and with total busloads averaging 650 million trips 
annually. Therefore, the load subsidy is assumed to be about $0.5 per trip. 
In a moderate case, the government can hopefully increase busloads by 36 
million trips a year with the proposed incentive strategy. The threshold D 
can then be set at 686 million loads (= 650 million + 36 million) for pay-
ing the extra subsidy. This means that if the annual busloads, Nb , exceed 
the threshold of 686 million, the bus consortium can obtain an extra $0.5 
subsidy per load, i.e. GP+ (Nb
+ ) =0.5  Nb
+  .  Nb
+  = Nb
 -650 million. Restated, 
GP+ (Nb
+ ) denotes the total extra subsidy based on the extra loads Nb
+  over 
the increased volume D’=36 million.
• Bus Consortium’s Proposition. According to the data from the Taipei City 
Bus Consortium, their ticketing agent currently receives 4.063 percent of 
revenue from the selling price. The basic price C issued from the consortium 
is $575.62 per ticket card on account of the selling price of $600. Because the 
government is to pay an extra subsidy at level of threshold D, the consortium 
accordingly decides what threshold H’ of the extra cards sold for the bonus 
provision proposed to the agent will maximize their own profit under the 
consideration of slope K ($/card sold). H’ =(H-650 million)/40 in that each 
card can pay for 40 trips. However, H’  must be equal to or larger than D’ 
/40, which is dominated by the government. Based on Equation (36), the 
bonus is herein designated by B(Q(T)) = K · Q(T), if Q(T)>=H; otherwise, 
B(Q(T)) = 0.  f  is counted at $0.76 per card for processing expenditures.
• Ticketing Agent’s Plan. In the case of a promotion for bus passengers, a reward 
of $5 million is provided for the game. Of this total, $2 million is for instant 
rewards uniformly distributed over the whole year, and $3 million is for the 
^
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delayed prize, the final lottery reward. Referring to Equation (6)~(8), M2(t) 
is estimated about $38,462 per week.  M1(t) = $3 million.
• Others. Six percent is taken as a default for the annual interest rate in the fol-
lowing analysis. The expectation E(M) based on M1 and M2 and proportional 
to the market volume is calculated iteratively and finalized by the amount 
of ticket sold Q(T). Refer to Equation (2),  f (Mj) = Lj  /Q(T), for all j.
According to official estimates by Taipei, the market has 600,000 attendants. 
Replacing the personal extra card demand qc
+ (t) with the market volume in Equa-
tion (44) and substituting into q(t) of the model described in section 2, the optimal 
card price p*c  , the total extra quantity of cards sold Q
*
c 
+
 (T), total extra gain of the 
agent G*+, and total extra net revenue of the bus consortium W*+ will then be cal-
culated for each type under previous parameters, consciousness, and assumptions. 
Figure 2(a) illustrates the agent’s maximal extra gain curves G*+ with respect to the 
threshold H’ under the condition of marginal bonus K=$6 per card sold. Figure 
2(b), (c), and (d) display the relevant plots related to the optimal card price, total 
extra profit for the bus consortium, and total extra quantity of passengers loaded 
(Nb
+  = 40 · Q*c 
+
 (T)), respectively. According to Figure 2(a), the agent’s reaction is 
obviously based on what H’ was provided by the consortium when calculating the 
maximal gain from one of three actions: Types I, II, or III.
When the threshold of extra cards sold for receiving the bonus from the bus 
consortium is less than .07 million (i.e., H’<.07 million), the agent’s best action 
is type III, selling more ticket cards earns him more money. If the threshold is pro-
vided between .07 million and .46 million, the best action is type II, in which the 
agent’s policy is to sell the ticket cards just to hit the threshold. Otherwise, H’>.46 
million, the best action is type I, not having interest in the bonus provided. There-
fore, the decision curve must be the bold envelope line—the linked line that each 
segment meets along the shapes or tangents to the spheres—indicated in Figure 
2(a). Under this circumstance, the corresponding curve in Figure 2(c) for the bus 
consortium’s profit is also bold.
From the bus consortium’s perspective, however, the maximal profit point occurs 
at H’=.46 million and the agent’s action should be type II. Because H’=.46 mil-
lion is the turning point of an agent’s decision for type I or II, the bus consortium 
should lower the threshold slightly from .46 million to ensure the agent’s locking 
at type II. The final equilibrium point between the bus consortium and the agent 
leads to the optimal ticket card price of $598 (Figure 2(b)), with total extra loads 
being 58.4 million (Figure 2(d)). The extra profit for the bus consortium would be 
^
^
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Figure 2.  Solution of the Presented Case
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$885,299,000 (Figure 2(c)), which includes the subsidy of $29.2 million from the 
government, supposing that the threshold of extra loads D’ for subsidy receipt is 
announced at 36 million by the government. The maximal extra gain by the agent 
at this equilibrium point is $37,707,00 (Figure 2(a)).
Table  summarizes the equilibrium results of the cases: D’=36 million, 54 million 
and 72 million with respect to K= 0, 2, 4, 6, 8, and 0. The table reveals that if the 
government sets the load threshold at 36 million for bus consortium subsidiza-
tion, the agent can easily achieve the target only via lottery strategy ( Nb
+  >36 mil-
lion), despite any bus consortium bonus incentive, even K=0 (no incentive). 
Table 1. Equilibrium Results of the Taipei Case in Presented Model
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Obviously, the agent will raise the ticket price to earn more profit if K is below $4. 
If the government sets the load threshold at 54 million for bus consortium subsi-
dization, the agent meets the target merely on the condition that K is greater than 
$4. In addition, if the government sets the load threshold at 72 million, the agent 
cannot achieve the target if K<=$0. However, the agent hopes that K is as large 
as possible while the bus consortium prefers a lower D’. According to Table , 
from the perspectives of the agent and bus consortium, D’=54 million through 36 
million is acceptable. Meanwhile, K=$0 is the best solution for their profits, with 
$37,828,400 extra gain for the agent and $975,89,000 for the consortium. Finally, 
bus trips would be increased by about 64.8 million annually.
Conclusions
This article presented a novel promotion strategy for public transit, with particular 
emphasis on strategy efficiency through an incentive system between passengers 
and ticketing agents, ticket agents and bus operators, and bus operators and 
the government. The mathematical model is formulated with a methodology of 
optimal control description of the market for this incentive system. This model 
focuses largely on maximizing the public transit market. Both the ticket agent and 
bus companies receive their maximal profits in an equilibrium market. Results 
obtained from this strategy can successfully enhance public transportation.
According to this study, a lottery game for bus passengers is very attractive to the 
people in Taipei City. Although the captive bus passengers are sensitive to changes 
in ticket price, both captive and noncaptive passengers reflect the same concerns 
about rewarding expectations. With the analysis in a previous model, clearly the 
proposed incentive strategy reveals the efficiency of traffic improvement. While 
public transport patronage is gradually decreasing, this study’s considerations are 
a useful contribution.
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